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INTRODUCTION 
The murder of George Floyd by police officers in Minneapolis incited not 
only activists in the Black Lives Matter movement but also tens of thousands of 
Americans and persons across the globe of all races and ages who now realize 
that police reform is necessary to achieve real equality among all persons in the 
United States and elsewhere.1 For as long as most Black Americans can re-
member, police have abused people of color in this country.2 In fact, police 
forces were originally created in the United States to catch and return escaped 
slaves to their “rightful” owners.3 But only with the recently-required use of po-
lice body cameras as well as the proliferation of cell phones that enable videos 
shot by bystanders have many other Americans recognized how dire the situa-
tion is.4 This recognition has led to inter-racial marches in the streets of major 
cities,5 charges against individual police officers for murder,6 and demands for 
new legislation on both federal and state levels to reform police practices, to 
limit police departments’ jurisdiction, and even to defund or abolish police de-
partments and to redirect funds to social services for poor people.7 No question 
 
1  See, e.g., Anthony Zurcher, George Floyd Death: Three Police Reform Plans Compared, 
BBC NEWS (June 17, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53083560 [https:// 
perma.cc/FM2Q-94KT]; Weihua Li & Humera Lodhi, The States Taking on Police Reform 
After the Death of George Floyd, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 18, 2020, 3:00 PM), https://fivethi 
rtyeight.com/features/which-states-are-taking-on-police-reform-after-george-floyd/ [https://p 
erma.cc/J66Z-5RMH]; Abdi Latif Dahir et al., George Floyd’s Killing Prompts Africans to 
Call for Police Reform at Home, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
07/03/world/africa/george-floyd-protests-police-africa.html [https://perma.cc/V5TV-FQRZ]. 
2  Anna North, How Racist Policing Took over American Cities, Explained by a Historian, 
VOX (June 6, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/6/21280643/police-brutality-viol 
ence-protests-racism-khalil-muhammad [https://perma.cc/83DQ-8T58]. 
3  Id. 
4  See Nicol Turner Lee, Where Would Racial Progress in Policing Be Without Camera 
Phones?, BROOKINGS (June 5, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/05/wh 
ere-would-racial-progress-in-policing-be-without-camera-phones/ [https://perma.cc/U2RK-A 
J9C]. 
5  A Timeline of the George Floyd and Anti-Police Brutality Protests, ALJAZEERA (June 11, 
2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/11/a-timeline-of-the-george-floyd-and-anti-p 
olice-brutality-protests; In Pictures: A Racial Reckoning in America, CNN (July 9, 2020, 
9:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/27/us/gallery/george-floyd-demonstrations/index.h 
tml [https://perma.cc/5NUM-4APV]; George Floyd: Videos of Police Brutality During Pro-
tests Shock US, BBC NEWS (June 5, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-529 
32611 [https://perma.cc/M58W-VSFX]. 
6  Brittany Shammas et al., Murder Charges Filed Against All Four Officers in George 
Floyd’s Death as Protests Against Biased Policing Continue, WASH. POST (June 3, 2020, 
8:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/03/george-floyd-police-officers-
charges/ [https://perma.cc/F4NR-M9N7]. 
7  Rashawn Ray, What Does ‘Defund the Police’ Mean and Does It Have Merit?, 
BROOKINGS (June 19, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/19/what-does-
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major reform is necessary. Without it, this country cannot move forward as a 
nation that espouses equal treatment of all. 
As efforts to reform police practices and to consider redirecting funding to 
social service agencies continue, we must understand that individuals with dis-
abilities, especially mental health, intellectual, and sensory perception disabili-
ties, also suffer serious abuse at the hands of police officers.8 Just as a person’s 
race increases the risk of arrest, so does a person’s disability.9 In fact, the inter-
section of Black or Latinx race and disability elevates the risk of arrest and in-
jury dramatically.10 In too many tragic cases, family members of an individual 
with bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, or other mental health disability call po-
lice for help transporting the individual to the hospital, but police escalate the 
tense situation, leaving the individual dead or seriously injured.11 In other cases, 
police shoot deaf individuals who unknowingly fail to follow their directions.12 
Given this reality, it is imperative that supporters of the Black Lives Matter 
movement consider the intersection of race and disability when making legal 
and policy recommendations for change. 
 This Article discusses the intersectional harms caused by the police to per-
sons of color with disabilities and analyzes the potential use of Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)13 to hold police departments liable for 
 
defund-the-police-mean-and-does-it-have-merit/ [https://perma.cc/2B4A-SH3A] (stating that 
“defund the police” does not mean abolish the police, but rather means to re-direct funding 
to other social service agencies, etc. that should have jurisdiction over many of the matters 
police get involved with); Scottie Andrew, There’s a Growing Call to Defund the Police. 
Here’s What It Means, CNN (June 17, 2020, 10:32 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/u 
s/what-is-defund-police-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/TG23-N5SF] (noting that different 
people mean different things when they say “defund the police;” some mean redirecting re-
sources from the police to social services agencies while others mean disbanding or abolish-
ing the police force). 
8  Even when not looking at police violence specifically, persons with disabilities are 2.5 
times more likely to be victims of violent crimes, and those with cognitive disabilities suffer 
the most violent crimes of those with disabilities. See ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU JUST. STATS., 
NCJ 250632, CRIME AGAINST PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 2009–2015 STATISTICAL TABLES 
3–4 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/capd0915st.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU7R-
9M2E]; Police Violence, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/police-
brutality/ [https://perma.cc/CV48-T5AL]. 
9  Susan Kelley, People With Disabilities More Likely to Be Arrested, CORNELL CHRON. 
(Nov. 30, 2017), https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2017/11/people-disabilities-more-likely-be-
arrested [https://perma.cc/DBD9-8H8F]. 
10  See infra notes 18–27 and accompanying text. 
11  See, e.g., Hall v. City of Walnut Creek, No. C 19-05716, 2020 WL 408989, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 24, 2020); Sheehan v. City of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014). 
12  See, e.g., Shaun King, North Carolina Police Kill Unarmed Deaf Man Who Was Using 
Sign Language, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 22, 2016, 10:49 AM), https://www.nydailynews.co 
m/news/national/king-n-police-kill-unarmed-deaf-mute-man-sign-language-article-1.276071 
4 [https://perma.cc/P74N-ZY29]. 
13  42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
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injuries and deaths suffered during and immediately following arrests.14 First, it 
discusses the research establishing that persons of color with disabilities suffer 
serious harms at the hands of the police.15 Second, it explores varying interpre-
tations of Title II of the ADA as well as possible amendments to the Act that 
would make it more responsive to the needs of those who are wrongfully in-
jured by the police.16 Finally, it recognizes the limitations of lawsuits and en-
courages others to solve this problem not only through this law, but also 
through community alternatives such as redirecting police funding towards re-
sources that support individuals with mental health and other disabilities.17 The 
Article concludes that police reform must focus not only on race but also on the 
intersectional harms caused by race and disability in detailing how to interpret 
and change policy and law. Moreover, it recognizes that changes in law alone 
likely will not provide the relief we need, but that a concerted approach to 
changing law and policies on federal, state, and local levels combined with ef-
forts at cultural change may promise important relief from the disregard for life 
and limb of our citizens that is now taking place. 
I. DIS/ABLED, OF COLOR, AND VULNERABLE TO POLICE ENCOUNTERS: DATA 
AND STORIES 
Accurate information about how many people of color with disabilities are 
arrested, harmed, and/or killed by police is relatively difficult to find, but there 
is no question that police are more dangerous to individuals of color than to 
white people.18 And, the research and commentary demonstrate that police vio-
lence poses even greater danger to persons of color with disabilities.19 A recent 
public health study calculates the cumulative possibility of being arrested by 
the age of twenty-eight.20 The study found that while 27.55 percent of whites 
have a cumulative probability of arrest before the age of twenty-eight, Blacks 
have a cumulative probability of arrest of 37.30 percent during the same time 
period.21 The cumulative probability of arrest of persons without disabilities is 
29.68 percent, and for those with disabilities the cumulative probability of ar-
rest rises to 42.65 percent.22 When we look at persons with disabilities who are 
 
14  To the extent that the abusive police officers are employees of federal agencies, rather 
than of state, county, and city agencies, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 would 
be applicable. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The same standards are applicable to both Section 504 and 
the ADA. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002). 
15  See discussion infra Part I. 
16  See discussion infra Section II.B. 
17  See discussion infra Section II.B.2, Conclusion. 
18  Erin J. McCauley, The Cumulative Probability of Arrest by Age 28 Years in the United 
States by Disability Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1977, 
1977–78 (2017). 
19  Id. at 1978 tbl.1. 
20  Id. at 1977. 
21  Id. at 1978 tbl.1. 
22  Id. 
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Black, the cumulative probability of arrest is 55.17 percent (as opposed to 
39.70 percent for whites with disabilities).23 Being male and Black raises the 
cumulative probability of arrest for persons with disabilities to 65.73 percent.24 
For Latinx individuals, the cumulative probability of arrest of persons without 
disabilities is 31.37 percent, and for those with disabilities, it rises to 46.12 per-
cent.25 For Latinx males with disabilities, the percentage rises to 57.69%.26 
Clearly, this study demonstrates that at least when it comes to arrests, there is 
an intersectional effect on persons of color with disabilities, with even higher 
arrest rates for males in these categories. It is likely, given these numbers, that 
intersectional disadvantage applies to killings by the police as well.27 
Unfortunately, there is no governmentally-operated national database that 
catalogues all killings of civilians by police that reports race and disability sta-
tistics.28 There are a number of databases, however, operated by the federal 
government and news organizations that catalogue deaths of civilians by police, 
most of which report race of the victims and at least one (potential) disability 
 
23  Id. 
24  Id. The raw numbers are based on a study of nearly 9,000 individuals who had completed 
data on race, gender, and disability for longitudinal surveys from 1997–2014, conducted by 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
27  Frank Edwards et al., Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the United States by 
Age, Race-Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PNAS 16793, 16783 (2019). 
28  See Kelly Gates, Counting the Uncounted: What the Absence of Data on Police Killings 
Reveals, in DIGITAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRATIC FUTURES 121, 121 (Michael X. Delli Carpini 
ed., 2019) (discussing on the overall lack of statistics); see also DAVID M. PERRY & 
LAWRENCE CARTER-LONG, THE RUDERMAN WHITE PAPER ON MEDIA COVERAGE OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT USE OF FORCE AND DISABILITY 2 (2016), https://rudermanfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/MediaStudy-PoliceDisability_final-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ3 
G-W3AA]. The U.S. House of Representatives recently passed a bill (on 6/25/20) that would 
fill this gap. George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. § 223 
(2d Sess. 2020). The bill would require reporting of “the national origin, sex, race, ethnicity, 
age, disability, English language proficiency, and housing status of each civilian against 
whom a local law enforcement officer or tribal law enforcement officer used force.” Id. Sec-
tion 341 requires regulations for data collection that “provide[s] that the data collected 
shall—(A) be disaggregated by race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, disability, and reli-
gion.” Id. § 341. Section 114 includes a provision for Law Enforcement Grants that de-
scribes pilot programs that must include “policies, practices, and procedures addressing 
training and instruction to comply with accreditation standards in the areas of . . . (G) inter-
actions with—. . . (ii) individuals with disabilities.” Id. § 114. It also requires “uniform 
standards on youth justice and school safety” to consider “adolescent development and any 
disability . . . .” Id. Section 364 “Peace Act” requires the Attorney General to provide guid-
ance to Federal law enforcement agencies on “how a Federal law enforcement officer can—
. . . (ii) use the least amount of force when interacting with—. . . (IV) persons with mental, 
behavioral, or physical disabilities or impairments.” Id. § 364. The Senate did not vote on 
this bill before the end of the last session. Actions Overview of H.R.7120—George Floyd 
Justice in Policing Act of 2020, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-
congress/house-bill/7120/actions [https://perma.cc/3MLS-K2JX] (showing the last action 
taken on the bill prior to the end of session was the Senate placing the bill on calendar as a 
general order). 
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category—“mental illness.”29 The information in these data sources is derived 
from police and media reports and may widely undercount persons with disa-
bilities because the databases categorize only by what they call “mental illness” 
and do not categorize by other disabilities including hidden emotional and men-
tal disabilities and all physical disabilities such as sensory perception disabili-
ties.30 Moreover, even in the category of “mental illness,” the databases report 
“mental illness” only when it has been mentioned specifically in a police report 
or in the news media.31 It is likely, therefore, that the data on those with “men-
tal illness” undercount those with psychiatric, intellectual, and emotional disa-
bilities. Nonetheless, these databases, combined with other sources of data, in-
cluding reports by foundations and advocacy organizations for persons with 
disabilities, give us some idea of the prevalence of police violence against per-
sons with disabilities. And, while they provide no empirical data that helps us 
crunch the numbers, lawsuits alleging police brutality against persons with dis-
abilities vividly illustrate police mistreatment of individuals with disabilities.32 
Acknowledging that this information, even when combined, is not perfect, this 
Part collects the data that is available. Based on the data catalogued and the sto-
ries told by the lawsuits, it is safe to say that there is a serious problem for not 
only Black and Latinx individuals but more particularly for those individuals of 
color who also have mental health disabilities (and particularly, for men of col-
or with mental health disabilities). 
A. Federal Database—The National Violent Death Reporting System 
In 2002, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) created the 
federal database, the National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS), 
 
29  See, e.g., Julie Tate et al., Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/gra 
phics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ [https://perma.cc/2QMW-GXGT]; Use of 
Force, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=84 [https://perma. 
cc/S8KX-NKCJ]. “Mental illness” used as a broad term does not always give us a clear idea 
whether an individual has a disability or not. And, if so, what that disability is. See Emily 
Bulthuis, Mental Illnesses: Terms to Use. Terms to Avoid., HEALTH PARTNERS, https://www. 
healthpartners.com/blog/mental-illnesses-terms-to-use-terms-to-avoid/ [https://perma.cc/6Y6 
6-5W5N]. The preferred term is “psychiatric disability.” See PERRY & CARTER-LONG, supra 
note 28, at 26. 
30  See Tate et al., supra note 29; CONNOR BROOKS, ET AL., FEDERAL DEATHS IN CUSTODY 
AND DURING ARREST, 2016–2017—STATISTICAL TABLES, 3, 4, 7, 8, 13 (2020), https://www.b 
js.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdcda1617st.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6BQ-3V9V] (showing and de-
scribing the methodology used by the Bureau of Justice). 
31  See Tate et al., supra note 29; A person with “mental illness” as reported by police or me-
dia may or may not necessarily be a person with a disability, but, given that the reports men-
tion “mental illness” the behavioral issues identified by these reports likely come from disa-
bilities such as a person with unmedicated bipolar disease, or schizophrenia. These would 
most likely qualify as disabilities under the ADA. 
32  See, e.g., Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 Supp. 3d 409, 412–14 (D. Md. 
2015). 
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which reports shooting deaths of civilians by police.33 By 2015, it covered only 
twenty-seven states, but more recently, there is data from fifty states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia and Puerto Rico.34 Nonetheless, because of a lag in analyzing 
the data and categorizing it, this information is currently available only from 
thirty-four states up to 2017.35 A research report that analyzed the individual 
data reported in the NVDRS for 2015 against five open sourced databases 
found that the information in NVDRS coincides closely to that available on the 
open source databases, and therefore the authors concluded the NVDRS is 
comprehensive and largely accurate.36 While only general information is avail-
able to the public that does not include mental health status of individuals, with 
special permission, researchers working on academic projects may at times ac-
cess individual information that would include the mental health status of the 
individual.37 Because I did not have access to the NVDRS individual data, I 
take the research report noted here seriously and conclude that a good source 
(or perhaps the best source right now) is the news service databases because not 
only are they consistent with one another, but research demonstrates that the 
data in these databases is also consistent with the data reported in the 
NVDRS.38 
B. News Service Databases 
As noted, historically, there has been no official count of individuals killed 
by the police nationwide.39 This failure has led to a number of open source ma-
terials published mainly by media. The Washington Post and The Guardian 
have databases of persons shot and killed by the police for certain years. 
The Washington Post’s database includes fatal shootings by on-duty police 
officers of civilians from January 1, 2015 to the present.40 As of February 10, 
2021, this national database reports, police had killed 6,032 civilians.41 Twenty-
 
33  CDC, CDC’S NATIONAL VIOLENT DEATH REPORTING SYSTEM (NVDRS), https://www.cdc. 
gov/violenceprevention/pdf/NVDRS-factsheet508.pdf [https://perma.cc/GSR9-SPTC]. 
34  Id. 
35  National Violent Death Reporting System, CDC (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/inj 
ury/wisqars/nvdrs.html [https://perma.cc/3VAN-W54R]. 
36  See Andrew Connor et al., Validating the National Violent Death Reporting System as a 
Source of Data on Fatal Shootings of Civilians by Law Enforcement Officers, 109 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 578, 578–83 (2019) (concluding that the NVDRS’ reporting of twenty-seven 
states at the time of their research provided a “comprehensive count of fatal police shoot-
ings,” but because it takes nearly eighteen months for information to appear in the NVDRS 
and it does not include other fatal encounters with the police, crowdsourcing materials from 
the media should also be consulted for comprehensive information). 
37  See, CDC, supra note 33. 
38  See, e.g., Tate et al., supra note 29; CDC, supra note 33. 
39  See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
40  See Tate et al., supra note 29. 
41  Id. As of February 10, 2021, police had killed 990 persons nationwide since February 10, 
2020. Id. This number includes not only shootings but also police-related deaths caused by 
21 NEV. L.J. 1081 
1088 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:3  
four percent of those shot and killed were black, seventeen percent were Latinx, 
and forty-six percent were white.42 Black and Latinx civilians were killed at a 
much higher rate than were white civilians: Blacks were killed at a rate of thir-
ty-four per million; Latinx at a rate of twenty-six per million; and whites at a 
rate of fourteen per million.43 
As with the NVDRS, while there is no category for persons with disabili-
ties as a comprehensive group, the Washington Post database allows a search 
for persons with “mental illness” who have been killed by police.44 The defini-
tion of “mental illness” is not given, and the database includes this category on-
ly if the media reports from which the database draws its information have not-
ed that the person had a mental illness.45 Nonetheless, using the “mental 
illness” filter, the database reports that 1,397 people or 23 percent of persons of 
all races killed over the past five and one-half years have been identified as ex-
periencing “mental illness.”46 Two hundred twenty-two individuals or 4 percent 
of those shot and killed by police were Black and identified as having a mental 
illness; of those 220 individuals, 209 were male.47 One hundred eighty individ-
uals or 3 percent of those shot and killed by police were Latinx and identified 
as having a mental illness over the same time period; of those 180 individuals, 
172 were male.48 These numbers very likely underestimate not only Black and 
Latinx citizens with disabilities but all persons with disabilities who have been 
shot and killed because the source of the information, police reports and media 
reports, do not always mention that a person killed has a “mental illness” unless 
it is obvious. Moreover, a “mental illness” as categorized here likely underes-
timates those with psychiatric, emotional, and intellectual disabilities and does 
not even attempt to count those with physical disabilities who are killed by po-
lice. 
 The Guardian’s database covers 2015 and 2016 only, but it is more com-
prehensive in that it includes all persons who were killed by police whether 
during arrest or in custody, by guns, taser, or other method.49 In the most recent 
year recorded, 2016, according to this database, 1,093 persons were killed by 
 
other means such as tasers and vehicles. Id.; see also Samuel Sinyangwe et. al., Mapping 
Police Violence, MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/planning-
team [https://perma.cc/JXZ9-3LH5]. 
42  Tate et al., supra note 29. 
43  Id.; see also Sinyangwe et. al., 2020 Police Violence Report, MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, 
https://policeviolencereport.org/ [https://perma.cc/B32Y-DS76] (“Black people were more 
likely to be killed, more likely to be unarmed and less likely to be threatening someone when 
killed.”). The graph demonstrates the same for Latinx people. Id. 
44  See Tate et al., supra note 29. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  See Jon Swaine et. al., The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, GUARDIAN, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/about-the-counted 
[https://perma.cc/8N9H-TP6R]. 
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the police in the United States, 266 (253 male) of whom were Black, 183 (181 
male) of whom were Latinx, and 574 (532 male) of whom were white.50 These 
numbers, which loosely track those found in the Washington Post database, 
demonstrate that Blacks were killed at a disproportionate rate to their percent-
age of the population.51 
C. Foundation and Advocacy Organization Reports 
A report by the Ruderman Family Foundation52 estimates that persons with 
disabilities account for one-third to one-half of all use-of-force incidents com-
mitted by the police.53 The Ruderman White Paper examines individual cases 
and how they are reported by the media.54 It concludes that disability, along 
 
50  Id. 
51  In 2019, the census estimates that non-Hispanic white persons represent about 60% of the 
population, while Black and Latinx persons represent 13.4% and 18.5% of the population. 
See QuickFacts: United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fac 
t/table/US/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/AGE9-GG63]. According to The Guardian’s data, 
whites killed by police equaled 53% of the total; Blacks killed by police equaled 24% of the 
total; Latinx persons killed by the police equaled 17% of the total. See Jon Swaine & Ciara 
McCarthy, Young Black Men Again Faced Highest Rate of US Police Killings in 2016, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2017, 7:00 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/08/the-
counted-police-killings-2016-young-black-men [https://perma.cc/M7U2-R2F3]. Other data-
bases that track police killings of citizens exist as well. They include: Sinyangwe et. al., su-
pra note 41 (crowd sourced database that catalogues police killings of civilians by any 
means and records police department, geography, race, whether the victim was armed, and 
means of death); D. Brian Burghart, Methodology, FATAL ENCOUNTERS (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://fatalencounters.org/methodology [https://perma.cc/B2JM-CVNM] (database whose 
goal is to record every police killing whether intentional or accidental from January 1, 2000 
to the present; categories include: name, city, county, state, race, age, gender, year, date of 
injury resulting in death, cause of death, and the police agencies involved); Gun Violence 
Archive, GVA, https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/ [https://perma.cc/6EMH-WFJ3] (The 
archive records all gun violence deaths including those perpetrated by police. The website 
states, “Gun violence and crime incidents are collected/validated from 7,500 sources daily—
Incident Report and their source data are found at the gunviolencearchive.org.website.”). 
52  Our Story, RUDERMAN FAMILY FOUND., https://rudermanfoundation.org/about-us/our-
story/ [https://perma.cc/G6QD-BRMB]. The Ruderman Family Foundation is a philanthropic 
organization with the following mission: 
The Ruderman Family Foundation believes that inclusion and understanding of all people is es-
sential to a fair and flourishing community. Guided by our Jewish values, we advocate for and 
advance the inclusion of people with disabilities throughout our society; strengthen the relation-
ship between Israel and the American Jewish Community; and model the practice of strategic 
philanthropy worldwide. We operate as a non-partisan strategic catalyst in cooperation with 
government, private sectors, civil society, and philanthropies. 
Id. 
53  PERRY & CARTER-LONG, supra note 28, at 7. 
54  Id. at 1. This source, which is relied on heavily by researchers, is not accepted by all. Ac-
tivists for persons of color with disabilities fault the report for not giving activists the credit 
for their views and work. See Leroy F. Moore, Jr., et. al., Accountable Reporting on Disabil-
ity, Race, & Police Violence: A Community Response to the “Ruderman White Paper on the 
Media Coverage of the Use of Force and Disability,” HARRIET TUBMAN COLLECTIVE 1–3 
(2016), https://docs.google.com/document/d/117eoVeJVP594L6-1bgL8zpZrzgojfsveJwcWu 
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with race and class, create a higher incidence of intersectional harm caused by 
the police, but even so, the fact that a victim has a disability is often ignored by 
the press.55 When the media reports a disability, the Report notes, it evokes 
sympathy for the victim or blames victims for their own deaths.56 Simultane-
ously, the Report concludes, the media represent Blacks as dangerous and vio-
lent, a depiction that affects (and likely reflects) implicit biases.57 
The Report, which covers the period of 2013 through 2016, analyzes not 
only empirical evidence of persons with disabilities who are injured or killed by 
the police, but also stories of victims whose disabilities were either ignored or 
used to distort the truth and blame the victim for their deaths.58 Examples in-
clude well-known cases: Eric Garner, who was severely asthmatic and morbid-
ly obese, and who died in an illegal police chokehold in New York City;59 
Freddie Gray, who had severe lead poisoning as a child that likely caused intel-
lectual disabilities, and who died at the hands of Baltimore police who gave 
him a “rough ride” to the police station;60 and Sandra Bland, who had depres-
sion and epilepsy, and who may have been suffering from withdrawal from her 
epilepsy medications at the time of her death by suicide in a police holding 
cell.61 All three of these victims were Black, and the intersection of race and 
disability was hardly noted by the media. 
The Report also discusses the cases of less well-known victims, like John 
Williams, a deaf First Nation member who, when ordered by police coming 
from behind him to drop a small knife he had in his hand, did not react, and 
was gunned down by the police with five shots;62 like DeVaughn Frierson, 
 
HpkNcs/edit [https://perma.cc/K2VA-PYGC]. They also note that the Report, by its failure 
to recognize the importance of race to disability abuse by the police furthers a white suprem-
acist agenda. Id. at 6. They state that the Report mentions intersectionality but does not do a 
complete intersectional analysis, and that the two authors are white men, one of whom does 
not have a disability. Id. at 1–2. This critique demonstrates that the Report lacks a deep anal-
ysis of the important intersection of race and disability and of the work of persons of color in 
the disability community. The critique, however, does not seem to dispute many of the facts 
and the statistics presented in this empirical study. See generally id. 
55  PERRY & CARTER-LONG, supra note 28, at 1. 
56  Id. at 6. A meta-study of research studies on police use of force and persons with disabili-
ties concluded that the terminology used by the studies can be not only discriminatory but 
can also affect reality and the allocation of power. See Tyler Frederick et al., Police Interac-
tions with People Perceived to Have a Mental Health Problem: A Critical Review of 
Frames, Terminology, and Definitions, 13 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 1037, 1046–48 (2018). It 
noted that different terminology was used without clear definitions and the most common 
use of “persons with mental illness” raises questions of validity and precision. See id. 
57  See PERRY & CARTER-LONG, supra note 28, at 4. 
58  Id. at 1. The Report states: “ ‘The Counted’ tracks 27% of all individuals killed by police 
in 2015 as having ‘mental health’ issues, or 270 people. The Washington Post currently re-
ports 235 individuals with ‘signs of mental illness’ shot by police.” Id. at 7. 
59  Id. at 15–16. 
60  Id. at 16. 
61  Id. at 17. 
62  Id. at 18. 
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Dwight Harris, Nicholas Kincade, and Brian Sterner, all of whom were wheel-
chair users who were dumped to the ground by police from their wheelchairs;63 
and like Kajieme Powell and Kristiana Coignard, both of whom had psychiatric 
disabilities, who were gunned down by police.64 
The Ruderman Report also noted that the Treatment Advocacy Center es-
timates that one in four persons involved in fatal encounters with the police has 
a severe mental illness; those with severe mental illness are sixteen times more 
likely to be killed during an encounter with the police.65 
These findings by The Ruderman Report confirm concerns about underre-
porting of persons with disabilities and their encounters with police. The next 
subsection describes the allegations in court cases brought under both the ADA 
and Section 1983 that tell vivid stories about police abuse of persons of color 
(and white people as well) with disabilities. 
D. Legal Stories 
Stories abound in lawsuits against police and police departments that esca-
lated dangerous situations in response to persons with disabilities. Here are on-
ly a few of them: 
Miles Hall was a twenty-three-year-old black man who lived with his fami-
ly in Walnut Creek, California.66 Diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder after 
his family called the police for help transporting him to the hospital for an in-
voluntary commitment proceeding, Hall was known to the police as a person 
with a mental health disability and the police placed a “hazard” on his ad-
dress.67 The hazard meant that if the police were called in the future to this ad-
dress, officers would work to de-escalate the situation.68 The complaint alleged 
that no responding officer followed the hazard when the family called subse-
quently to ask the police to transport Hall to the hospital.69 Instead, the officers 
shot and killed Hall as he ran toward them with a gardening rod in his hand.70 
Teresa Sheehan was a Japanese-American woman in her fifties with a psy-
chiatric disability who lived in a group home.71 Her social worker became con-
 
63  Id. at 19. 
64  Id. at 20–21. 
65  Id. at 8; DORIS A. FULLER ET AL., OVERLOOKED IN THE UNDERCOUNTED: THE ROLE OF 
MENTAL ILLNESS IN FATAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ENCOUNTERS 1 (2015). 
66  Hall v. City of Walnut Creek, No. C 19-05716, 2020 WL 408989, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
24, 2020) (denying in part and granting in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss); see also 
Walnut Creek Police Facing Lawsuit Over Fatal Shooting of Mentally Ill Man, CBS S.F. 
(Sept. 12, 2019, 7:00 PM), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2019/09/12/miles-hall-walnut-
creek-police-department-lawsuit-officer-involved-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/K84S-PDY3]. 
67  Hall, 2020 WL 408989, at *1. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. at *6. 
70  Id. at *1. 
71  Sheehan v. City of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part, cert. 
dismissed in part, City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 (2015); see also 
21 NEV. L.J. 1081 
1092 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:3  
cerned that her mental health was deteriorating because she stopped taking her 
medications and eating; he thought she was a danger to herself and to others 
when she threatened him when he attempted to perform a welfare check on 
her.72 He called the police for help transporting Sheehan to the hospital for an 
involuntary commitment under California law.73 When two police officers ar-
rived, they opened Sheehan’s door with a key, and Sheehan threatened them 
with a knife; the police retreated to outside Sheehan’s room.74 Rather than wait-
ing for backup to de-escalate the situation even though they could hear the si-
rens of the backup officers, the officers broke down Sheehan’s door and pep-
per-sprayed her in the face.75 Sheehan threatened them with a knife again, and 
they shot her five or six times.76 Sheehan survived the shooting but was gravely 
injured.77 
Gary Roell had schizoaffective disorder and paranoid delusions for years.78 
He stopped taking his medication regularly, and when his wife was out of town, 
he went to the neighbor’s house and threw a plant through her window.79 The 
neighbor’s son called 911, and when officers arrived at the scene, Gary was in a 
state of delirium and yelling something about water.80 The officers attempted to 
control Gary a number of times and ultimately tasered him to the ground.81 
Roell stopped breathing, and the paramedics were unable to revive him.82 
Gerrit Vos, a young white man, was acting “erratically” and waving scis-
sors when police were called to the scene at a 7-Eleven.83 Vos ran around the 
store and yelled as other customers in the store continued to mill around; an 
employee tried to remove Vos’s scissors and was cut.84 Police were aware that, 
at one point, Vos simulated having a gun behind his back.85 Vos went into a 
back room, and all of the employees and customers left the store.86 Police made 
no attempt to communicate with Vos, but when police opened the front doors, 
 
Sandra Allen, The Trials of Teresa Sheehan, CTR. FOR L., BRAIN & BEHAV. (July 9, 2015), 
https://clbb.mgh.harvard.edu/the-trials-of-teresa-sheehan/ [https://perma.cc/G6VR-VVUL]. 
72  Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1215; Allen, supra note 71. 
73  Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1215. 
74  Id.; Allen, supra note 71. 
75  Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1215–16, 1219–20; Allen, supra note 71. 
76  Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1216. 
77  Id. at 1215–16. 
78  Roell v. Hamilton County, 870 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2017) (upholding lower court’s 
grant of summary judgment to the defendants). 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. at 477–78. 
82  Id. at 478. 
83  Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2018) (overturning the low-
er court’s grant of summary judgment, which held that the defendant’s action was objective-
ly reasonable as a matter of law). 
84  Id. at 1028–29. 
85  Id. at 1029. 
86  Id. 
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Vos ran out with something in his hand above his head, and within seconds was 
killed by two officers who shot Vos with AR-15s, even though there was an-
other policeman who had a less-lethal weapon.87 Vos died on the scene.88 Only 
eight seconds elapsed from the time that Vos left the back room until the time 
when he was shot in front of the building.89 Officers at the scene were aware 
that Vos was likely “mentally unstable” or under the influence of drugs, and 
they discussed using non-lethal force.90 Vos had been diagnosed earlier with 
schizophrenia;91 after his death, his blood tested positive for amphetamine and 
methamphetamine.92 The object in his hand turned out to be a metal display 
hook.93 
These stories put human faces on the victims of police action that may or 
may not result from good intentions but that cause more harm than good. The 
question is: How do we reduce police abuse of individuals of color with disa-
bilities? The next Part describes the law, which to date has been inadequate in 
solving this problem. But it also suggests the use of the ADA as a possible, par-
tial solution to police brutality. 
II. THE LAW AS REMEDY: CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURES AND THE ADA 
A. The Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Law and Qualified Immunity 
Countless law review articles argue for changes in the federal judiciary’s 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
law and the doctrine of qualified immunity as potential remedies to killings and 
maimings by police of individuals suspected of criminal behavior.94 These arti-
cles, which analyze civil rights cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 198395 for vio-
lation of constitutional rights of the victims, clearly demonstrate that the federal 
 
87  Id. at 1029–30. 
88  Id. at 1030. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. at 1029. 
91  Id. at 1030. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 48, 51, 
88 (2018) (concluding that the doctrine of qualified immunity has no basis in common law 
and, therefore, is illegal); Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Spe-
cial Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 52–53, (1989); Devon W. Carbado, 
Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 
1519–22 (2016) (arguing that one cause of police violence is qualified immunity). 
95  42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in-
jured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
Id. 
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judiciary’s interpretation of the law does little to protect individuals of color 
from the excesses of the police.96 In fact, scholars perceive that a significant 
number of these suits result in grants of defendants’ motions to dismiss and 
summary judgment, leaving plaintiffs without remedies and police with little 
disincentive to continue their methods of policing.97 
I will not repeat the arguments contained in these articles, but instead I 
briefly summarize the law as applied and critiques advanced by other legal 
scholars. A search or seizure by the police is unconstitutional if it is held to be 
unreasonable by the courts.98 There are a number of limitations on lawsuits 
brought by individuals under Section 1983, however, which provides a federal 
civil remedy for constitutional violations committed “under color of state 
law.”99 First, in the context of a police brutality claim, the Supreme Court in 
Graham v. Connor100 held that the standard for judging whether a police of-
ficer’s behavior is unconstitutional is “objective reasonableness,” and requires 
consideration of the conditions at the time when the police officer who engaged 
in a challenged search confronted the alleged victim.101 This standard has been 
criticized repeatedly by law professors102 because it precludes consideration of 
 
96  See Carbado, supra note 94, at 1519–23 (arguing that police are not deterred from acting 
violently because of the interpretation of the qualified immunity doctrine, including the fact 
that: 1) courts avoid determining whether there was a constitutional violation (the police be-
havior was unreasonable) and move directly to analyze whether the right was “clearly estab-
lished;” 2) courts conclude the right was not clearly established unless nearly every police 
officer would know about it; 3) courts look to similar cases and many require near identical 
facts to the case at bar to determine that the right was clearly established; and 4) nearly all 
officers who are found to have violated the plaintiffs’ civil rights are indemnified by police 
departments for the damages); see also Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 402–05 
(S.D. Miss. 2020) (noting that qualified immunity and other limitations were added by the 
courts to a statute whose purpose was to protect the people from the government but that 
now with these restrictions the courts are protecting the government from the people). 
97  See, e.g., Roell v. Hamilton County, 870 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2017) (upholding lower 
court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants). 
98  See Carbado, supra note 94, at 1520. 
99  A similar action against federal employees (including, for example U.S. border patrol) 
who violate the U.S. Constitution or federal law was approved by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389, 
427 (1971). 
100  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
101  Id. at 388, 396–97 (“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact 
that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that 
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a 
particular situation.”). 
102 See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, Intersectionality and Policing: Class and Excessive Force, 
89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (proposing intersectionality theory analysis that 
emphasizes the class structure to reveal excessive force doctrine as a means of boundary 
management); Jeffrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and Reasonableness in Police 
Killings, 100 B.U. L. REV. 951, 951, 998, 1000–04 (2020) (finding in an empirical study of 
police shootings and comparing the circumstances of the shootings that twice as many blacks 
are killed under the same circumstances as whites, and suggesting that the “objective reason-
ableness” standard is not actually objective as applied). 
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an officer’s state of mind while simultaneously setting the default as no liability 
on grounds that an officer is acting hastily.103 
Moreover, because of the Eleventh Amendment, there is no remedy in 
damages if the state (rather than a city or municipality) is the defendant.104 
Most police departments are municipal or county entities rather than state enti-
ties, however, and therefore they can be sued for damages under Section 
1983.105 But there is an important limitation on plaintiffs’ ability to prevail in 
these suits: plaintiffs in a Section 1983 suit against a city or county must prove 
the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom.106 Thus, the behaviors of 
a rogue police officer may not lead to a sustainable lawsuit against the police 
department unless it was caused by the city or county’s policy, custom, or prac-
tice. 
Individual police officers, however, may also be sued under Section 
1983.107 The problem with these suits from the plaintiffs’ perspective is that the 
 
103  Cooper, supra note 102. 
104  The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” 
Bradford R. Clark & Vicki C. Jackson, The Eleventh Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR., 
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendment-xi/interps/13 
3 [https://perma.cc/8DFD-853H]. The Supreme Court has interpreted it broadly to prohibit 
damages actions against states brought under federal law or the U.S. Constitution, including 
by citizens of the state in question. Id. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal lawsuits 
against states for damages unless the suits are brought pursuant to a statute that validly abro-
gated the Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. Even where the state has immunity to damag-
es lawsuits, plaintiffs may bring individual claims against state police officers for damages. 
Id. Under Title II of the ADA, Eleventh Amendment immunity likely depends on the type of 
claim brought by the plaintiffs. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 513–14, 530–34 
(2004) The Supreme Court held that Congress properly abrogated the state’s Eleventh 
Amendment immunity when it comes to cases of denial of access to the courts for persons 
with disabilities. Id. at 533–34. The plaintiffs were persons with paraplegia, one a criminal 
defendant and one a court reporter, who could not appear in court because of the stairs in the 
courthouse. Id. at 513–14. The Court emphasized that Title II protects a number of different 
rights that derive from the constitution as well as other rights that may be considered less 
important (such as the availability of seating for a hockey game), and it refused to hold that 
in every instance Title II validly abrogated the Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 530–
31. Nonetheless, it appears that when a statute protects the underlying Fourth Amendment 
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, as Title II does in the context of police 
abuse of citizens with disabilities, Lane should govern. 
105  Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385–390 (1989). 
106  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978) (holding that a suit against 
the city for constitutional violations requires a showing of either a finalized policy or a cus-
tom that has not been adopted as a policy); see also Lowry v. City of San Diego, 858 F.3d 
1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that under Monell, a city is liable if the plaintiff proves 
an unreasonable use of force and that the city’s policy caused the constitutional wrong). 
107  Teressa E. Ravenell & Armando Brigandi, The Blurred Blue Line: Municipal Liability, 
Police Indemnification, and Financial Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 62 VILL. L. 
REV. 839, 840 (2017). 
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courts have granted broad qualified immunity to individual police officers.108 A 
Section 1983 suit against an individual police officer can proceed only if the 
right violated was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation.109 
Although this formula appears sensible because its purpose is seemingly to give 
notice to police officers before holding them liable, courts have interpreted 
“clearly established” extremely narrowly, focusing on slight differences in fact 
patterns between the earlier police behavior that was deemed unreasonable and 
the police behavior that is before the courts, and concluding that these differ-
ences mean that the constitutional right was not clearly established in the case 
at bar.110 This constitutional factual nitpicking has guaranteed that many police 
officers faced with an alleged violation may not be held civilly liable unless the 
circumstances are substantially similar to others in the past that courts have 
deemed unconstitutional.111 
Because of all these limitations, the potential for civil liability both of the 
police departments and individual police based on violations of the Fourth 
Amendment have had little apparent effect on deterring police misbehavior. 112 
Currently, there is a movement in Congress to abolish qualified immunity for 
individual police officers.113 This solution would hold more police officers in-
dividually liable for unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment.114 It appears, however, that absent a Democratic majority in both 
 
108  See Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 62–65 (2016). But see Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified 
Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 9–10 (2017) (agreeing that Supreme Court and lower court 
jurisprudence has favored defendants on qualified immunity but finding in a comprehensive 
empirical study across five federal district courts that qualified immunity causes cases to be 
dismissed on motions to dismiss or summary judgment in only 3.9% of cases). 
109  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
110  See Tyler Finn, Note, Qualified Immunity Formalism: “Clearly Established Law” and 
the Right to Record Police Activity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 447–48 (2019). 
111  See generally Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386 (S.D. Miss. 2020). Cf. 
Schwartz, supra note 108, at 10 (concluding based on a comprehensive empirical project 
studying cases in five federal court circuits that qualified immunity does not necessarily pro-
tect police officers from discovery and trials in civil lawsuits). 
112  See Carbado, supra note 94, at 1519–24. 
113  H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2020). 
114  A number of states have introduced bills limiting or abolishing qualified immunity. See, 
e.g., Robert Storace, Police Accountability Bill Curbing Qualified Immunity Advance in 
State Senate, LAW.COM (July 27, 2020, 6:35 PM), https://www.law.com/ctlawtribune/2020/0 
7/27/police-accountability-bill-curbing-qualified-immunity-advances-to-state-senate/ [https:/ 
/perma.cc/X73B-USV7] (Connecticut); Nicollette J. Zulli, Destined for Demise? The Fate of 
the Qualified Immunity Doctrine Remains Uncertain Amid Newest Federal and State Polic-
ing Reform Efforts, WHITE-COLLAR CRIM. LAW (July 13, 2020), https://www.mondaq.com/u 
nitedstates/constitutional-administrative-law/965334/destined-for-demisethe-fate-of-the-qual 
ified-immunity-doctrine-remains-uncertain-amid-newest-federal-and-state-policing-reform-e 
fforts [https://perma.cc/3P3C-LCN5] (describing the federal bill introduced in the Senate as 
well as bills introduced into the state legislatures in Massachusetts, Colorado, and New 
York). There are also police departments that are prohibiting certain police practices such as 
chokeholds. See Kimberly Kindy et al., Half of the Nation’s Largest Police Departments 
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houses of Congress or even a filibuster-proof sixty vote super-majority, this bill 
will not be enacted into law.115 
To summarize Fourth Amendment law and its consequences, first, it is 
very difficult to prove that a search or seizure is unreasonable. Second, even 
where it is considered unreasonable, however, most governments employing 
the police are not liable unless the police are acting pursuant to a policy or cus-
tom, and third, although lawsuits against individual police are possible, the 
courts have liberally permitted individual police officers to claim qualified im-
munity. 
An alternative to lawsuits for police abuse by persons with disabilities 
based on constitutional violations is potentially Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, which I discuss in the next subsection. This alternative, how-
ever, may be ineffective, depending on how courts interpret Title II in the cir-
cumstances of police arrests of persons with disabilities. If the courts interpret 
Title II to give the broadest scope of coverage and the greatest protection to 
persons with disabilities against police discrimination and brutality, Title II is 
capable of providing needed relief in damages, and creating a disincentive for 
police abuse of individuals with disabilities. If not, Title II may deny rights or 
grant rights without remedies for individuals injured or killed by the police’s 
failure to reasonably accommodate individuals with disabilities during arrests 
and after. 
The next Section analyzes Title II, how it has been applied by various 
courts, and the web of barriers most of those courts create for individuals with 
disabilities who seek to redress the police’s failure to grant Title II rights. It ex-
plains how the courts should rule properly under Title II to afford rights and 
maximum deterrence of police abuse. Given that I am not confident that the 
courts, as currently configured, will follow this broad coverage, in the alterna-
tive, this Section encourages Congress to once again revise the ADA to assure 
the broad coverage that was envisioned first when the law was passed in 1990, 
and second, when it was amended in 2008.116 
 
Have Banned or Limited Neck Restraints Since June, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2020, 10:47 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/national/police-use-of-force-chokehold-car 
otid-ban/ [https://perma.cc/P7AE-69Y4] (noting that at least thirty-two of the sixty-five larg-
est police departments in the U.S. have banned or strengthened prohibitions on neck holds 
since Floyd’s death). 
115  Eric Boehm, Senate Republican Police “Reforms” Won’t Touch Qualified Immunity, 
REASON (June 10, 2020, 5:30 PM), https://reason.com/2020/06/10/senate-republican-police-r 
eforms-wont-touch-qualified-immunity/ [https://perma.cc/LLE4-6AF6]. But see Jordain 
Carney, GOP Senator Introducing Bill to Scale Back Qualified Immunity for Police, THE 
HILL (June 23, 2020, 10:40 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/504065-gop-senator-i 
ntroducing-bill-to-scale-back-qualified-immunity-for-police [https://perma.cc/56YH-8GP 
M]. 
116  See infra notes 119–127 and accompanying text for a brief description of the history of 
the ADA and its amendments. 
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B. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Partial Solution 
A possible, partial solution to the courts’ cramped interpretation of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence is Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.117 
The ADA was passed in 1990 with a broad mission to eliminate discrimination 
against and grant positive rights to persons with disabilities in employment, 
public services, and public accommodations.118 
Title II of the ADA applies to state, county, and city governmental entities 
and makes it illegal to exclude from participation in government services or to 
discriminate against individuals with disabilities in the provision of public ser-
vices, programs, or activities.119 Title II requires that the government entity 
make reasonable modifications to policies, practices, or procedures to assure 
the participation of persons with disabilities unless the defendant can demon-
strate that the requested modifications fundamentally alter the nature of the ser-
vice, program, or activity.120 This aspect of the law creates affirmative obliga-
 
117  42 U.S.C. § 12132 states: “Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified indi-
vidual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in 
or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be sub-
jected to discrimination by any such entity.” 
42 U.S.C. § 12131 states: 
As used in this subchapter: 
(1) Public entity 
The term “public entity” means— 
(A) any State or local government; 
(B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States 
or local government; and 
(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in 
section 24102(4) of Title 49). 
(2) Qualified individual with a disability 
The term “qualified individual with a disability” means an individual with a disability who, with 
or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, 
communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets 
the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs 
or activities provided by a public entity. 
Id. 
118  What is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)?, ADA NAT’L NETWORK (Jan. 2021), 
https://adata.org/learn-about-ada [https://perma.cc/89M4-2646]. 
119  See supra note 117. The pertinent regulation states: “No qualified individual with a disa-
bility shall, on the basis of disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the ben-
efits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion by any public entity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a) (2008). 
120  The pertinent regulation states: “A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in 
policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modi-
fications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 28 
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2008). 
      Besides the defense of a fundamental alteration, in this situation, police departments ar-
gue that individuals pose a direct threat to the health or safety of themselves or others and 
are therefore not qualified under Title II. The direct threat language states: 
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tions that extend beyond the requirements of the other civil rights laws that 
merely forbid discrimination.121 Because there are many social and physical 
barriers to persons with disabilities and equal treatment requires removal of 
those barriers wherever possible, the law requires affirmative action to do so.122 
Early in the history of the ADA, the Supreme Court interpreted coverage of 
the ADA narrowly—specifically in its definition of who qualifies as a person 
with a disability.123 In response to these limiting decisions, in 2008, Congress 
amended the ADA by passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amend-
ment Act (ADAAA) to assure broad coverage of the Act.124 The Amendments 
broadly define who is a person with a disability and clearly were intended to 
expand the coverage beyond the courts’ interpretation of the Act.125 
 
(a) This part does not require a public entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit 
from the services, programs, or activities of that public entity when that individual poses a direct 
threat to the health or safety of others. 
(b) In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others, a 
public entity must make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies 
on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: the na-
ture, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually oc-
cur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures or the provision 
of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk. 
28 C.F.R. § 35.139 (2016). 
121  See Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Intersectional Cohorts, Dis/ability, and 
Class Actions, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 319, 324–25 (2020) (explaining that the ADA’s 
reasonable accommodation requirement goes beyond the anti-discrimination requirements of 
other civil rights laws). 
122  Id. 
123  See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Explaining “Not Disabled” Cases Ten Years after the 
ADAAA: A Story of Ignorance, Incompetence, and Possibly Animus, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY 
L. & POL’Y 383, 384–89 (2019). 
124  See infra note 125. 
125  Congress stated in its Findings and Purposes of the ADA: 
FINDINGS AND PURPOSES OF PUB. L. 110–325 Pub. L. 110–325, §2, Sept. 25, 2008, 
122 Stat. 3553, provided that: 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that— 
(1) in enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) [42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.], 
Congress intended that the Act “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” and provide broad coverage; 
(2) in enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that physical and mental disabilities in no way 
diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, but that people with physi-
cal or mental disabilities are frequently precluded from doing so because of prejudice, antiquated 
attitudes, or the failure to remove societal and institutional barriers; 
(3) while Congress expected that the definition of disability under the ADA would be interpreted 
consistently with how courts had applied the definition of a handicapped individual under the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. 701 et seq.], that expectation has not been fulfilled; 
(4) the holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) 
and its companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by 
the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect; 
(5) the holding of the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Wil-
liams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) further narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afford-
ed by the ADA; 
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While the ADAAA did not explicitly amend Title II of the Act, which ap-
plies to governmental bodies other than the federal government, it did amend 
the definition of “person with a disability,” and Congress instructed judges to 
pay more attention to the defendant’s behavior (rather than the plaintiff’s sta-
tus) to determine whether a violation of the Act has occurred.126 In essence, 
Congress made clear that the ADAAA’s purpose was to assure broader protec-
 
(6) as a result of these Supreme Court cases, lower courts have incorrectly found in individual 
cases that people with a range of substantially limiting impairments are not people with disabili-
ties; 
(7) in particular, the Supreme Court, in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. 
v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), interpreted the term “substantially limits” to require a greater 
degree of limitation than was intended by Congress; and 
(8) Congress finds that the current Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ADA regula-
tions defining the term “substantially limits” as “significantly restricted” are inconsistent with 
congressional intent, by expressing too high a standard. 
(b) PURPOSES—The purposes of this Act [see Short Title of 2008 Amendment note above] 
are— 
(1) to carry out the ADA’s objectives of providing “a clear and comprehensive national mandate 
for the elimination of discrimination” and “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards ad-
dressing discrimination” by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under the 
ADA; 
(2) to reject the requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases that whether an impairment substantially lim-
its a major life activity is to be determined with reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigat-
ing measures; 
(3) to reject the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 
(1999) with regard to coverage under the third prong of the definition of disability and to rein-
state the reasoning of the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 
273 (1987) which set forth a broad view of the third prong of the definition of handicap under 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; 
(4) to reject the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), that the terms “substantially” and “major” in 
the definition of disability under the ADA “need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding 
standard for qualifying as disabled,” and that to be substantially limited in performing a major 
life activity under the ADA “an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely re-
stricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily 
lives”; 
(5) to convey congressional intent that the standard created by the Supreme Court in the case of 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) for ‘substantially 
limits’, and applied by lower courts in numerous decisions, has created an inappropriately high 
level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA, to convey that it is the intent of 
Congress that the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether 
entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to convey that the 
question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not de-
mand extensive analysis; and 
(6) to express Congress’ expectation that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will 
revise that portion of its current regulations that defines the term “substantially limits” as ‘signif-
icantly restricted’ to be consistent with this Act, including the amendments made by this Act. 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-55 (2008). 
126  Id. 
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tion for individuals with disabilities and to make proof of a disability easier to 
accomplish.127 
Individuals with disabilities (or the executors of their estates) have used Ti-
tle II to argue that their deaths or injuries caused by the police violated the 
ADA.128 The courts that hold that Title II applies to the police actions have 
generally recognized three potential causes of action: wrongful arrest;129 failure 
to reasonably accommodate (or make reasonable modification);130 and failure to 
adequately train the police force.131 A failure adequately to train likely would 
be a failure of the defendant city, county, or police force, but a failure to rea-
sonably accommodate or modify policies and wrongful arrests likely will occur 
during policing at the level of the individual police themselves. While all of the 
circuits deciding the issue have agreed that Title II governs police interactions 
with individuals with disabilities, there are a number of circuit splits and other 
differences about how the lower courts interpret Title II and its relationship to 
police behavior.132 An analysis of these issues appears in the next subpart. 
 
127  Id. 
128  See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 133–37, 138, 178–81; supra notes 66–93. 
129  This is a cause of action for an arrest of an individual for behavior that is not criminal 
that the police mistake. An example is the situation where the police arrest for drunk driving 
an individual who is driving erratically but the individual is not drunk but a diabetic who 
needs insulin. 
130  This is the most common cause of action, and it is commonly described as failure to rea-
sonably accommodate rather than failure to make reasonable modifications in polices, prac-
tices or procedures. While the “reasonably accommodate” language comes from Title I, the 
employment title of the ADA, the correct language is the “reasonable modification” lan-
guage appearing in Title II. Nonetheless, it appears that the courts are analyzing the cases the 
same way whether they are using the “reasonable modification” language or the “reasonable 
accommodation” language. Another possible cause of action would hold the government lia-
ble for its failure to provide auxiliary aids and services, a cause of action that is described in 
Liese v. Indian River County Hospital District, 701 F.3d 334, 336 (11th Cir. 2012). 
131  This is a cause of action that is less recognized by the courts but should also be a poten-
tial cause of action under Title II given that the defendants in Title II cases will always be the 
city or other governmental entity for which the officers work and there is no cause of action 
against individual defendants. The failure to adequately train the force takes into account the 
failure to recognize the issues that arise with persons with disabilities and to instruct police 
officers on how to reasonably modify their behaviors when faced with the situation of a per-
son with disabilities. The legislative history of Title II of the ADA clearly demonstrates that 
Congress contemplated that public services (governments) will be liable under the ADA if 
they fail properly to train the police. For example, in a congressional hearing describing the 
Act, Representative Steny Hoyer stated: 
[T]itle II covers the range of services, benefits, and programs offered by State and local govern-
ments. It also includes providing training to public employees in order to ensure that discrimina-
tory actions do not occur. For example, persons who have epilepsy are sometimes inappropriate-
ly arrested because police officers have not received proper training to recognize seizures and to 
respond to them. In my (sic) situations, appropriate training of officials will avert discriminatory 
actions. 
101 Cong. Rec. E1913, E1916 (daily ed. June 13, 1990). 
132  There are a number of good student notes on the topic of the different standards used by 
different circuits. See generally, Robyn Levin, Note, Responsiveness to Difference: ADA Ac-
commodations in the Course of an Arrest, 69 STAN. L. REV. 269 (2017); Andrew J. 
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1. Application of Title II to Police Conduct 
All courts dealing with the issue of whether Title II applies to police con-
duct look to the broad language of the statute, the legislative history, or both, to 
conclude that police or other security forces’ conduct during arrests, interroga-
tion, and imprisonment is covered by Title II of the ADA. These cases rely on 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey133 in reaching this conclu-
sion. In Yeskey, the Supreme Court rejected the state’s argument that Title II 
does not apply to prisons because residing in a prison is not voluntary and held 
that Title II applies to conditions, programs, and services in imprisonment.134 
Using a textualist approach, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, dismissed the 
argument that Congress did not intend for the ADA to apply to state prisons 
stating, “the fact that a statute can be ‘applied in situations not expressly antici-
pated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates 
breadth.’ ”135 
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken on whether Title II can be 
used to attack police misconduct during the arrest stage, lower courts have ap-
plied Yeskey to conclude that Title II applies to police misconduct in arrests, 
interrogations, and investigations.136 A number of issues have developed among 
the federal courts as to application of the law. These issues include: 
 
Lohmann, Note, Arrests and Title II of the ADA: Framework of Claims for Monetary Dam-
ages, 56 WASHBURN L. J. 559 (2017). Because my space is limited, I will not repeat elabo-
rate descriptions of the cases discussed in the student notes and the standards used by these 
courts but will instead analyze how the courts apply those standards, and other pertinent is-
sues regarding this topic that are not discussed in the student notes. 
133  Pa. Dep’t. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208 (1998); see, e.g., Haberle v. Troxell, 
885 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 1985) (concluding that police can violate the ADA by failing to 
make reasonable accommodations to an individual’s disability during an arrest); Seremeth v. 
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs., 673 F.3d 333, 336–7 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that while the ADA is 
applicable during arrests and officers are obligated to give a reasonable accommodation to 
persons with disabilities, in the case at bar the officers acted reasonably as a matter of law). 
But see Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the ADA does 
not protect individuals with disabilities in their dealings with police; the ADA is not applica-
ble to officers’ on-the-street responses to disturbances). 
134  Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 209–11. 
135  Id. at 212 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 499 (1985)). This lan-
guage was recently reaffirmed in a Title VII case, Bostock v. Clay County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 
1754 (2020), holding that discrimination “because of sex” includes discrimination based on 
an individual’s sexual orientation and/or transgender identity or status even though at the 
time Title VII was passed Congress was likely not considering that sexual orientation or 
trans identity would be protected from discrimination. Moreover, even without the decision 
in Yeskey, lower courts could have relied on the legislative history, which makes clear that in 
the very least a failure to train police would create liability under Title II. See supra note 
131. 
136  The major case holding that Title II does not apply until the police secure the scene is 
Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000). This is the minority view. In City of 
San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 608–09 (2015), the Supreme Court dismissed the 
Title II portion of the case because the City and County of San Francisco filed a cert petition 
defining the issue as whether Title II applies to police behavior during an arrest, but in its 
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• Whether Title II applies to police conduct occurring during an arrest or 
seizure before the police “secure the scene;” 
• Whether plaintiffs must prove intentional discrimination (discriminatory 
animus or deliberate indifference) to establish liability and/or to collect 
damages under Title II of the ADA; and 
• Whether in a Title II suit against a governmental unit the defendant is vi-
cariously liable in respondeat superior for discriminatory acts by offic-
ers when engaged in arrests or investigations.137 
In the next subsections, I analyze these three issues and ultimately con-
clude that under a proper, broad reading of the ADA, one sanctioned by the 
drafters of the ADAAA Amendments, exigency should be analyzed as part of 
the “reasonable modifications” analysis; that plaintiffs need not prove inten-
tional discrimination (discriminatory animus or deliberate indifference) of the 
police in order to recover damages against the governmental entity; and that 
governmental entities should be liable vicariously in respondeat superior for the 
illegal actions of its officers who act within the scope of their employment. To 
the extent that courts disagree with these conclusions, I encourage Congress to 
amend Title II of the ADA to accord necessary protection to individuals with 
disabilities who deal with the police. 
a. Reasonable Modifications Analysis: Applying Yeskey Before the 
“Scene is Secured” 
Given Yeskey, all lower courts deciding whether the ADA applies to police 
conduct in the field have agreed that it does.138 But there is a difference among 
the courts as to when Title II comes into play with policing. A majority of the 
courts of appeals deciding this issue conclude that Title II is applicable to ar-
rests, and that exigency arising during the arrest can be considered in determin-
ing whether a modification of policy, practice, or procedure is reasonable or 
not.139 A small minority of federal courts conclude that Title II is not applicable 
during arrest until after the police “secure the scene,” concluding that before 
the scene is secured that exigency exists and applying Title II would not be rea-
sonable as a matter of law.140 
The majority is the better view because there is no specific “exigency” ex-
ception in the statutory language of Title II itself, and because, as a practical 
matter, exigency will be considered in determining whether proposed modifica-
 
briefs did not challenge whether police behavior during arrests is covered by Title II but ar-
gued on narrower grounds that the plaintiff was not a “qualified” individual with a disability 
because she posed a direct threat to the health and safety of others. In dismissing certiorari 
on the Title II issue, the Court made clear that the question of whether Title II applies to ar-
rests is not a settled question, at least when it comes to the time before the police secure the 
scene. Id. at 610. 
137  See infra Sections II.B.1.a; II.B.1.b; & II.B.1.c, respectively. 
138  The U.S. Supreme Court questioned this analysis. See supra note 136. 
139  See Levin, supra note 132, at 285–294. 
140  Id. at 287. 
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tions would have been reasonable under the specific circumstances.141 This is 
an intensely fact-based analysis that should take account of how the scene un-
folded and the how police officers’ actions affected the scene or perhaps even 
caused more danger to the alleged victim. In fact, in a number of the reported 
cases, it is the police’s aggressive behavior and failure to adapt procedures to 
the individual with a known disability that creates the exigency in the first 
place.142 In other words, it is the police’s failure to grant the victim a reasonable 
modification that increases the danger that things will go astray. If we do not 
consider police behavior at this stage, many unnecessary police-imposed deaths 
and injuries will occur. 
City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan provides an example. In that 
case, the officers seem to have acted reasonably when they first entered the vic-
tim’s room, and, when faced with Ms. Sheehan’s threats with a knife, the offic-
ers retreated, and called for backup.143 But for an unknown reason, even though 
backup was on its way and the backup’s sirens could be heard by the officers at 
the scene, minutes after retreating, the officers decided to re-enter the victim’s 
room by breaking down her door.144 Because the victim was alone in her room 
on the second floor, there was little chance that she would be a danger to her-
self or others during the time it would take for specially-trained backup officers 
to arrive at the scene.145 Therefore, there was at least a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether waiting for the trained backup would constitute a reasonable 
modification of a policy or practice (assuming there was a policy or practice 
that would encourage immediate re-entry), especially given that the officers 
knew that the victim was a person having a mental health crisis.146 
The only defenses available to the reasonable modification requirement are 
that the modification would “fundamentally alter” the public service147 or that 
the alleged victim was not qualified under the ADA because she imposed a di-
rect threat to health and safety of herself or others.148 If the public service here 
is the police response to a call for help for a person experiencing a psychiatric 
 
141  As explained in supra note 120, there is a defense if the modification would fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the service; moreover, in order to be a qualified individual with a dis-
ability, one must not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others. 
142  See e.g., City of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 602–605 (2015). 
143  See id. at 604. The facts recited in this section come from the courts’ opinions in re-
sponse to the defense motion for summary judgment, and, therefore are described in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 603. I do not know whether these facts are all true, but 
this lack of knowledge proves my point. Determining the facts and inferences drawn from 
them is the factfinder’s job, and, given those facts, the jury should conclude whether there 
was a reasonable modification that the officers should engage. 
144  Id. at 605. 
145  Id. at 603. 
146  Id. 
147  See supra note 120 for the language of Title II relating to the “fundamental alteration” 
defense. 
148  While the other titles of the ADA (such as Title I) have an explicit direct threat defense, 
the defense to a Title II violation appears in the regulations. See supra note 120. 
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crisis, there is little question that reasonably modifying the police’s ordinary 
aggressive responses in order to de-escalate the conflict would not fundamen-
tally alter the nature of their service. Moreover, the officers knew Ms. 
Sheehan’s condition as they were briefed by the social worker when they ar-
rived on the scene.149 Even though Ms. Sheehan had threatened them with a 
knife, they also knew that the threat arose when and because they invaded her 
space.150 There was at least a question of fact as to whether the police officers 
had a reasonable concern that she would escape or was in imminent danger of 
harming herself in her room. For this reason, and given that the officers could 
hear their counterparts arriving at the location, a reasonable jury could conclude 
that it was unreasonable for them to aggravate Ms. Sheehan’s fear by escalating 
the violence of the police action and breaking down her door to re-enter, which 
they should have expected would re-trigger her fearful reaction. A reasonable 
modification of their policies and procedures that would accommodate Ms. 
Sheehan and decrease the danger to both Ms. Sheehan and the officers would 
have been, a jury could conclude, to wait the few minutes for backup to arrive 
and to plan with their more experienced counterparts how to de-escalate the sit-
uation.151 
Certainly, when the police create the circumstances that lead to the exigen-
cy, the department should not be able to defend against a civil lawsuit under the 
ADA by claiming that it would have been unreasonable for them not to use le-
thal force against the alleged victim. In other words, the police’s role in creat-
ing the exigency needs to be taken into account in determining whether the po-
lice should have reasonably accommodated Ms. Sheehan or made reasonable 
modifications to their policies and procedures. It is for this reason that the exi-
gency of the situation needs to be analyzed to determine whether there was a 
plausible reasonable modification available. Police officers’ inappropriate rush-
ing into a scene and making the matter worse must be considered in determin-
ing whether the police’s response violated Title II. 
The next Subsection discusses what state of mind of the actors is necessary 
to impose liability and/or damages under Title II. An intricately related ques-
 
149  Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 603–04. 
150  Id. 
151  The federal district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on both 
the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim and the ADA Title II count, 
which alleged that the police officers failed to make a reasonable modification of their pro-
cedures even though they were fully aware that the plaintiff was experiencing a psychiatric 
crisis. Sheehan v. City of S.F., No. C 09-03889, 2011 WL 1748419, at *7, *10–11 (N.D. Cal. 
May 6, 2011). The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment, 
concluding that, in the Title II claim, there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the 
officers reasonably accommodated the alleged victim. Sheehan v. City of S.F., 743 F.3d 
1211, 1233 (9th Cir. 2014). The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on both counts, re-
versed on the Fourth Amendment claim, and dismissed the certiorari on the ADA claim 
when the defendants took a different position than they had taken in the cert petition. 
Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 606. The petition for certiorari dismissal by the Supreme Court means 
that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Title II of the ADA is still good law in the circuit. 
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tion follows in Subsection c, which addresses whether municipalities or other 
government agencies operating police departments should be subject to vicari-
ous liability for the police officers’ actions under Title II, and if so, the guiding 
principles for liability. 
b. Requiring Proof of Intent for Liability? Damages? 
 Although Title II of the ADA does not mention intent, many courts have 
adopted an intent requirement for liability of the public services under Title II 
and all appear to require an intent showing for damages under Title II.152 The 
majority of courts seem to agree that the proper intent standard is “deliberate 
indifference,” rather than discriminatory animus.153 The deliberate indifference 
standard is drawn from the Supreme Court’s standard in Title VI and Title IX 
cases.154 The reasoning is complicated, but appears simple. The text of Title II 
of the ADA states, “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act] shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this 
subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disa-
bility in violation of section 12132 of this title.”155 In turn, the Rehabilitation 
Act incorporates “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”156 Title VI uses the same remedies as those 
available in Title IX.157 The Court has held that both Title VI and Title IX use 
the “deliberate indifference” standard for liability of the government entity.158 
Therefore, the argument goes, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II 
of the ADA use the intent standard, which is usually adopted as a “deliberate 
indifference” standard.159 
 
152  Mark C. Weber, Accidentally on Purpose: Intent in Disability Discrimination Law, 56 
B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1417–18 (2015); see also Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 431 (7th Cir. 
2020); Silberman v. Mia. Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1134 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that 
in order to collect damages, there must be a showing of deliberate indifference in a Title II or 
Section 504 case); Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 345 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that deliberate indifference rather than discriminatory animus is the proper state of 
mind for liability under Title II); Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding that deliberate indifference must be shown before the plaintiff may collect 
damages under Title II); Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 390 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that deliberate indifference required for compensatory damages under Title II of the 
ADA and Section 504). 
153  See, e.g., Liese, 701 F.3d at 345; Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138–39. 
154  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 524 U.S. 224, 274 (1998). 
155  42 U.S.C. § 12133. 
156  29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2). 
157  See Jones v. City of Detroit, No. 17-11744, 2019 WL 2355377, at *5 (E.D. Mich. June 4, 
2019); Weber, supra note 152, at 1436. 
158  See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 280 (Title VI); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 274 (Title IX). 
159  According to the court in Jones: 
[W]hen analyzing the ADA’s remedial scheme, the law operates like a matryoshka doll. To de-
termine whether a particular remedy is available under the ADA, the Court looks at its remedial 
scheme, which looks to the Rehabilitation Act, which looks to Title VI, which looks like Title 
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The Eleventh Circuit in Liese v. Indian River County Hospital District de-
fined “deliberate indifference.” It occurs when ‘“the defendant knew that harm 
to a federally protected right was substantially likely and . . . failed to act on 
that likelihood.”’160 The court noted that deliberate indifference goes beyond 
gross negligence,161 and it stated that “discriminatory animus,” which is not re-
quired to prove a violation, would require “a showing of prejudice, spite, or ill 
will.”162 In Duvall v. County of Kitsap, the Ninth Circuit, like all other circuits 
deciding these cases, held that in order to collect damages under Title II, the 
plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination; the court then adopted the de-
liberate indifference standard to fulfill the intent requirement.163 
In the face of the courts’ adoptions of an intent requirement for liability 
and/or damages under Title II, Professor Mark Weber, a well-respected aca-
demic and scholar of the ADA, argues convincingly that, at least for some of 
the Title II causes of action, proof of intent should not be required. Weber 
makes a sophisticated argument based on Title II’s statutory language and Su-
preme Court caselaw. In Accidentally on Purpose: Intent in Disability Discrim-
ination Law,164 Weber argues that the lower courts’ reasoning rests on errone-
ous assumptions.165 Weber relies on Alexander v. Choate166 and Barnes v. 
Gorman167 to demonstrate that a showing of intent (or deliberate indifference) 
should not be required for damages or monetary relief under Title II in reason-
able modifications cases.168 He explains that it makes sense to apply the Title 
VI and Title IX requirements of “deliberate indifference” in order to assess 
monetary relief and/or damages under certain Title II provisions—those that 
require a showing of intent in order to prove liability.169 But with Title II provi-
 
IX. Consequently, precedent interpreting the remedies available under Title VI or Title IX must 
be considered when analyzing the ADA’s remedial scheme. 
Id. at *5. 
160  Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 344 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588, 604 (11th Cir. 2010)). 
161  Id. at 344. 
162  Id. 
163  Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). For other cases holding 
that a showing of deliberate indifference is necessary to recover damages in a Title II case, 
see supra note 152. 
164  See Weber, supra note 152 at 1450–64 (2015) (explaining the three errors that lower 
courts have committed when requiring a showing of intent for reasonable modifications cas-
es under Title II: 1) Misguided analogies to Title VI and Title IX cases: 2) Reliance on dicta 
from a 1982 education case despite a legislative overruling of the dicta; and 3) A misstate-
ment as to a perceived (but non-existent) conflict between the IDEA (Individuals with Disa-
bilities Education Act) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA). 
165  Id. 
166  Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 294 (1985). 
167  Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (holding that the plaintiff in a Title II suit 
could recover compensatory damages but not punitive damages without proof of intent in a 
failure to accommodate case). 
168  See Weber, supra note 152, at 1448–50. 
169  In Barnes, the Supreme Court stated: 
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sions that do not require such a showing for proving liability, such as the rea-
sonable modifications requirement, it does not follow that intent must be 
proved for a damages award.170 This is the case because Titles VI and IX, un-
like Title II, always require a showing of intent for liability because they do not 
recognize either disparate impact or reasonable modifications causes of action, 
both of which do not require a showing of intent for liability.171 Title II, in con-
trast, provides for disparate impact and reasonable modifica-
tions/accommodations causes of action in addition to intentional violations.172 
As Professor Weber explains, Barnes173 and the legislative history of the ADA 
lend strong support to his argument.174 In Barnes, a reasonable modifications 
case involving police transportation of an individual with paraplegia, the Su-
preme Court held that because Titles VI and IX were passed pursuant to the 
Spending Clause of the Constitution, and ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act remedies are coextensive with those available in a Title VI private 
cause of action, contract remedies are appropriate.175 Thus, compensatory dam-
ages are available under the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
when the plaintiff proves the underlying requirements for liability, but punitive 
damages are not.176 This conclusion fits with the legislative history of both the 
ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Professor Weber concludes: 
Thus, broad remedies, consistent with concepts of reasonable expectations of 
loss, and including compensatory damages and other monetary relief, are availa-
ble for violations of section 504 and the ADA’s reasonable accommodations and 
disparate impact discrimination provisions. The legislative history of Title II 
emphasizes that a wide range of remedies exists for violations of the statute. The 
House Committee Report states that Congress intended to make the “full pano-
ply of [section 504] remedies available” in Title II cases, and cited a case 
providing damages against a governmental unit under section 504.177 
 
[T]he remedies for violations of § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are coex-
tensive with the remedies available in a private cause of action brought under Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., which prohibits racial discrimination in 
federally funded programs and activities. 
536 U.S. at 185. 
170  Weber, supra note 152, at 1441–44. 
171  Id. at 1440. 
172  Id. at 1445–49. 
173  Barnes, 536 U.S. at 181. 
174  Professor Weber also argues, by analogy, that the remedies under Title I of the ADA, 
which vary depending on the state of mind required for proof of liability, support his argu-
ment. See Weber, supra note 152, at 1429. 
175  Id. at 1448–49. 
176  Id. 
177  Id. at 1449 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101–485, pt.3, at 52 n.62, as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 475 n.62 (citation omitted)). 
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Professor Weber’s reasoning is correct. The court in I.L. through Taylor v. 
Knox County Board of Education178 relied on Weber’s reasoning when it ex-
plained: 
      People can sue only for intentional violations of Title VI. So one might think 
that people can sue only for intentional violations of Title II and § 504. Not so. 
While the Supreme Court has not outright said that § 504 covers unintentional 
discrimination, it has rejected the idea that § 504 covers only intentional dis-
crimination. And Title II, for its part, “concerns more than intentional discrimi-
nation.” Thus—despite the “remedies, procedures, and rights” language linking 
Title II, § 504, and Title VI—the first two diverge from Title VI at this point. 
They all contain an implied right to sue, but only Title II and § 504 cover both 
intentional and unintentional discrimination. Title II and § 504 provide greater 
rights than does Title VI. . . . 
      The next question—the real question here—is what a plaintiff must show to 
win an injunction, and what she must show to win damages. Barnes v. Gorman 
is instructive. In Barnes, the Supreme Court ruled that Title II and § 504 plain-
tiffs can win injunctions and compensatory damages but not punitive damages. 
The plaintiff had sued for failure to accommodate his disability. . . . 
      The defendant had unintentionally violated the plaintiff’s Title II and § 504 
rights, and so had to make good the wrong done by giving him damages. This 
suggests that a plaintiff can recover damages under Title II and § 504 without 
proving intent. . . . 
      It follows that a plaintiff can win an injunction under Title II and § 504 
without proving intent. Intent does not separate injunctions from damages. What 
really separates them is that injunctions may be awarded when damages would 
not be adequate to make up for the plaintiff’s harm. . . . What a plaintiff must 
prove at the merits stage is independent of what she must prove at the remedies 
stage. 
      And that is the key here: at the remedies stage. Eight courts of appeals re-
quire that a plaintiff prove some mental state before winning damages under Ti-
tle II and § 504. . . . 
      T[heir] reasoning, however, reads Guardians and Sandoval too narrowly. 
True, the Court did hold that intentional discrimination is required for damages 
under Title VI. But the Court held that intentional discrimination is required for 
any remedy under Title VI, as Title VI protects against only intentional discrim-
ination. So a Title VI plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination to win on 
the merits, not to get a specific remedy. And by reading Sandoval and Guardi-
ans too narrowly, courts have taken this element of a Title VI claim and made it 
the standard for Title VI damages. So these courts now say that intentional dis-
crimination is the standard for Title II and § 504 damages. . . . 
      There is nothing to indicate that a plaintiff must ever prove intentional dis-
crimination—or deliberate indifference—under Title II and § 504. What’s more, 
the Supreme Court has upheld a damages award in a Title II case involving no 
intent element. And . . . eight courts of appeals . . . have misconstrued Supreme 
Court case law.179 
 
178  I.L. v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 257 F. Supp. 3d 946, 967–69 (E.D. Tenn. 2017). 
179  Id. (citations & footnote omitted) (emphasis and indentations added). 
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Unfortunately, it appears that no other courts have agreed. Nonetheless, Ti-
tle II should not require a showing of intent in reasonable modifications cases 
for either equitable relief or compensatory damages. To make matters worse, 
the courts have applied the “deliberate indifference” standard unevenly, with 
the majority of published opinions interpreting “deliberate indifference” to be 
an “exacting” standard.180 
Gray v. Cummings181 is a good example of this trend. In Gray, the plaintiff 
experienced a “manic episode” and called the police.182 She was transported to 
the hospital and held there pursuant to statute against her will.183 A few hours 
later, the plaintiff escaped from the hospital, and the hospital called the po-
lice.184 Officer Cummings responded, saw Gray walking on the sidewalk, and 
approached her.185 When she did not follow his instructions and cursed at him 
repeatedly, he took her down to the ground, and when she continued to be un-
cooperative, he tased her in drive-stun mode.186 Gray suffered extreme pain 
from the tasing, and ultimately sued the police department and Cummings un-
der various statutes.187 In the Section 1983 claim for a Fourth Amendment vio-
lation, the First Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find that Cummings 
engaged in the unconstitutional use of excessive force against the plaintiff, but 
it also held that as a matter of law, the defendant Cummings was protected by 
qualified immunity.188 In the ADA claim, the court held, assuming that deliber-
ate indifference was a necessary showing for damages, that there was insuffi-
cient evidence from which one could conclude that Cummings demonstrated 
deliberate indifference.189 The court set out the standard: 
[T]o hold the Town vicariously liable under Title II based on Cummings’s de-
liberate indifference, Gray would have to show that Cummings knew that Gray 
had a disability that required him to act differently than he would otherwise have 
acted, yet failed to adjust his behavior accordingly. Thus, to prevail on her ver-
sion of the “effects” theory, Gray would at least have to show that Cummings 
knew that her failure to follow his orders was a symptom of her mental illness 
rather than deliberate disobedience (warranting criminal charges). Similarly, to 
prevail on her version of the “accommodation” theory, Gray would at least have 
to show that Cummings knew that there was a reasonable accommodation, 
which he was required to provide.190 
 
180  See, e.g., McCullum v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 768 F.3d 1135, 1147 (11th 
Cir. 2014). 
181  Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2019). 
182  The following description of the facts is written in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
because of the procedural posture of the case. These facts appear in id. at 6–7. 
183  Id. at 6. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. 
186  Id. at 6–7. 
187  Id. at 7. 
188  Id. at 8, 13. 
189  Id. at 17 (citing Nieves-Márquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 126 (1st Cir. 2003)). 
190  Id. at 18 (citation omitted). 
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Curiously, the court concluded that even though Cummings knew of the 
plaintiff’s mental illness, and that it was sufficiently severe for her to be hospi-
talized against her will, there was no evidence of Gray’s “particularized 
knowledge about the nature or degree of Gray’s disability.”191 And, according 
to the court, 
[w]ithout such particularized knowledge, Cummings had no way of gauging 
whether the conduct that appeared unlawful to him [her verbal resistance to ar-
rest] was likely to be a manifestation of the symptoms of Gray’s mental ill-
ness. . . . [and he] had no way of gauging what specific accommodation, if any, 
might have been reasonable under the circumstances.192 
Moreover, the court held, that without evidence that Cummings knew of 
the existence of national police standards of dealing with individuals with men-
tal illness the plaintiff’s case would fail.193 In essence, the court ruled “ ‘falling 
below national standards does not, in and of itself, make the risk of an ADA 
violation’ so obvious as to eliminate the knowledge requirement.”194 
Gray demonstrates the difficulty of proving deliberate indifference of the 
police, at least as the court interprets it. This case, on whose panel sat former 
Justice Souter of the Supreme Court, raises serious questions about whether the 
ADA, as currently interpreted to require deliberate indifference, could ever be 
used to assure rights of persons with disabilities in police confrontations.195 
Cummings clearly knew of the mental disability of his subject, but nonetheless, 
he tasered her, even though she was presenting no threat to herself or others, 
and he got away with it. 
c. Vicarious Liability? Respondeat Superior and Other Tests 
Closely related to the question of whether intent is required for liability 
and/or damages under the reasonable modifications requirement of Title II of 
the ADA are other questions that courts have addressed concerning government 
liability—including the proper standard for attributing liability to the govern-
ment entity for its police officers’ behavior.196 
In answering these questions, it is crucial to understand that under Title II 
of the ADA there is no right to a suit against individual defendants.197 The de-
 
191  Id. 
192  Id. 
193  Id. at 18–19. 
194  Id. at 19 (quoting Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 182 (3d Cir. 2018)). 
195  See id. at 5. 
196  See, e.g., Ravenna v. Vill. of Skokie, 388 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1004–07 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (dis-
cussing debate over imposing respondeat superior or vicarious liability in Title II ADA cases 
where there is no individual liability). 
197  The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided this issue, but nearly all lower courts facing this 
question have concluded (based on analysis of Title VII and the ADEA) that there is no indi-
vidual liability under the ADA. See City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 610 
(2015) (“Only public entities are subject to Title II”); Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346 
(7th Cir. 2000) (“Under Title II of the ADA . . . the proper defendant is that ‘entity.’ . . . [A]s 
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fendant in ADA suits, therefore, unlike those in lawsuits brought under Section 
1983, will always be the government entity controlling the police department, 
not individual police officers. And, because employers are commonly responsi-
ble under respondeat superior for the negligent acts of their employees commit-
ted in the scope of employment, one could argue that it follows that the gov-
ernment body that directs the police department should be liable not only 
directly for injuries caused by their own violations of the ADA but also vicari-
ously for violations of individual police officers who engage in wrongful arrest 
or a failure to accord reasonable modifications to citizens with disabilities in 
the field.198 Nothing in the ADA contravenes this fact. 
Furthermore, unlike lawsuits filed under Section 1983, those filed under 
the ADA against police departments should not necessarily require a showing 
of a departmental policy or practice. Title II explicitly creates affirmative obli-
gations on the public entities, requiring them to make reasonable modifications 
to policies and practices unless doing so would fundamentally alter the service 
rendered. Moreover, Title II: 
expressly provides that a disabled person is discriminated against when an entity 
fails to “take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a 
disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated different-
ly than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services.” 
A plain reading of the ADA evidences that Congress intended to impose an af-
firmative duty on public entities to create policies or procedures to prevent dis-
crimination based on disability. Thus, although it is true that for claims asserted 
under § 1983, an official policy must be identified, the same rule cannot be rec-
onciled with Congress’s legislative objectives in enacting the ADA and the [Re-
habilitation Act]. . . .199 
Despite this difference between lawsuits under Section 1983 and Title II of 
the ADA, courts have apparently transported concepts from Section 1983 suits 
into Title II actions. Some courts have required a policy or custom of the gov-
 
a rule there is no personal liability under Title II[.]”); see, e.g., Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 
F.3d 826, 829–30 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that there is no individual liability under Title I 
of the ADA); Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009–10 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that in 
Title II cases of the ADA there is no qualified immunity because there is no individual liabil-
ity; only the agency is liable under the Act); E.E.O.C. v. A.I.C. Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 
F.3d 1276, 1279–82 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that under Title I of the ADA there is no indi-
vidual liability because the purpose of the statute was to impose respondeat superior liability 
on the employer for the agents’ acts). But see Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 
1164, 1186 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is individual liability in a retaliation suit un-
der the ADA). Individual liability may exist, however, under state disability discrimination 
statutes. 
198  But see Ravenna, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1005 (stating that in the Seventh Circuit if there is 
no individual liability there is no vicarious liability of the governmental entity). 
199  Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567, 575 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) 
(also noting that although there is no intent standard for proving violations of Title II, it is 
necessary to prove intentional discrimination to collect damages under Title II). 
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ernmental unit to allocate responsibility to it.200 Others, as analyzed above, have 
required a showing of deliberate indifference on the part of officers involved, 
either to prove liability or to collect compensatory damages.201 Moreover, some 
courts add an additional requirement. They require not only a showing of delib-
erate indifference of the employees who are on the front lines, but also evi-
dence that the employees’ acts can be attributable to the government entity. In 
Liese, for example, the court referred to Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent 
School District,202 a Title IX case, and concluded that respondeat superior was 
not the proper standard under Title II for the governmental liability.203 For lia-
bility to attach to the hospital, there must be an official involved in the discrim-
inatory practice who “[has] the knowledge of and the authority to correct [the 
hospital’s] . . . discriminatory practices.”204 In that case, then, doctors, who had 
the authority to overrule nurses’ behaviors, would create liability on the part of 
the county when operating in the county hospital, but nurses would not.205 
In contrast, in Duvall, the Ninth Circuit held that the county was vicarious-
ly liable for the actions of its employees in respondeat superior and did not go 
through the same analysis as Liese in determining the organizational liability 
for its employees’ behaviors.206 In other words, under Duvall, it is not neces-
sary to demonstrate that an officer who violates a civilian’s Title II rights is an 
official who has the responsibility to affirmatively act to correct the error. It is 
sufficient that the officer failed to make reasonable modifications to policies 
and practices of the public service in order to accommodate the civilian with a 
disability. This is true to find a violation by the public service or governmental 
organization of Title II. But—and this is an important exception—Duvall, as 
noted above, also held that a showing of deliberate indifference is required for 
 
200  But see Rosen v. Montgomery County, 121 F.3d 154, 157 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (policy or 
custom not required for ADA liability); Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F. Supp. 933, 942 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to actions under 
§ 504 of Rehabilitation Act and specifically distinguishing Section 504 claims from § 1983 
claims). 
201  See supra Section II.B.1.b. 
202  Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 276, 290–91 (1998) (concluding in 
a Title IX case that deliberate indifference is the proper standard for determining whether a 
school is responsible for sex discrimination by its staff or students). 
203  Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 349 (11th Cir. 2012). 
204  Id. 
205  Id. at 350. 
206  Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001); see also, T.W. ex rel. 
Wilson v. School Bd., 610 F.3d 588, 604 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that the ADA allows for 
vicarious liability of the governmental organization under a theory of respondeat superior); 
Delano-Pyle, 302 F.3d at 574–75 (holding that proof of a policy or that the actor in question 
was a policymaker is not required under the ADA, and that there is respondeat superior lia-
bility, but that plaintiffs must prove that there was discriminatory intent to collect damages); 
Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2019) (concluding that whether the government 
is liable under Title II of the ADA only for actions of employees who are officials with pow-
er to change the situation or whether respondeat superior is the proper standard is an open 
question). 
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the plaintiff to collect damages. Given the near impossibility of attaining in-
junctive relief, Duvall’s ruling on respondeat superior may be an empty victory 
for plaintiffs.207 
When Congress passed the ADA and then years later amended the ADA 
with the ADAAA in order to assure greater coverage of the Act and protection 
of persons with disabilities, it communicated a vision for broad coverage of the 
Act. Given this legislative purpose, it is difficult to reconcile these cases that 
make it nearly impossible to grant a remedy to victims of police abuse. There-
fore, without openly addressing the fact, these cases interpret Title II to provide 
a right without a remedy. This cannot be how Congress intended that the courts 
interpret the Act.208 
2. Potential Judicial? Congressional? Solutions 
An ideal scenario would be for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on 
these difficult, interpretive Title II issues and to hold, consistent with the con-
gressional purpose of granting broad rights to persons with disabilities under 
both the original ADA and as amended under the ADAAA that: 1) Title II co-
vers police encounters with civilians and the issue of danger is ordinarily a 
question of fact that bears on the reasonableness of potential accommodations 
and/or modifications; 2) Because intent is not required in a Title II reasonable 
accommodation/modification case to prove liability, neither is it required to re-
cover compensatory damages under Barnes v. Gorman;209 3) Government enti-
ties employing police are vicariously liable for the Title II violations that police 
engage in when acting in the scope of their employment; and 4) Government 
entities employing police are directly liable without a showing of custom or 
practice for their negligence in failing to train or supervise police if it causes 
injury to civilians. 
 
207  For persons with disabilities who are stopped illegally by the police, it will be nearly im-
possible to prove that they are entitled to an injunction because in order to receive injunctive 
relief they must prove that they will be subject to the same treatment again. As the court in 
Gray v. Cummings stated, 
Past injury, in and of itself, “is an insufficient predicate for equitable relief.” To have standing to 
pursue injunctive relief, a plaintiff must “establish a real and immediate threat” resulting in “a 
sufficient likelihood that [s]he will again be wronged in a similar way.” . . . Gray cannot clear 
this hurdle. When all is said and done, it is not enough for Gray to show that because she has bi-
polar disorder, she is likely to encounter the police again. She must show that she is likely to be 
tased once more, and she has not managed any such showing. 
917 F.3d at 19 (citations omitted). 
208  The U.S. Supreme Court raised without deciding the question of whether the city and 
county are vicariously liable for police officers’ behavior that occurs with deliberate indif-
ference. See City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 608–10, (2015) (dismissing the 
grant of certiorari as improvidently granted in the Title II portion of the case); discussion 
supra note 151. 
209  The Court should conclude, based on Professor Weber’s analysis that this is so even 
though Title VI and Title IX cases do not permit compensatory damages absent a showing of 
deliberate indifference. 
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Given the current composition of the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts as well as the federal courts’ history of cutting back unreasonably on the 
rights of persons with disabilities granted by the ADA, I have little confidence 
that either the lower courts or the Supreme Court will decide these issues in an 
appropriate manner. If the Court does not decide these issues favorably to 
plaintiffs in the near future, and other circuits continue to hold that damages are 
not available where there is no showing of intent, Congress should take action 
again. 
Congress should amend the statute to clarify that Title II remedies include 
damages upon a showing of a violation of the statute in the reasonable accom-
modation/modifications context. Congress should make clear that those por-
tions of the statute do not require intent for liability, and, therefore, do not re-
quire proof of intent for damages. Moreover, Congress should make clear that: 
1) In suits against the city, county or police department, governmental immuni-
ty is waived by Title II and there is no need to prove a policy, custom, or prac-
tice of discrimination in order to recover; 2) Government employers are liable 
vicariously in respondeat superior for the actions of employees acting within 
the scope of their employment under Title II; and 3) There is no requirement 
under Title II for liability or the recovery of damages or other monetary or eq-
uitable relief for proof of an intent to discriminate or deliberate indifference on 
the part of the government or its employees. 
CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
There is plenty of room in Title II law to alleviate the severe problem of 
police abuse of people of color with disabilities. I have outlined how courts 
should interpret Title II of the ADA to assure more careful and respectful 
treatment of the most vulnerable members of our society in the policing con-
text. If the ADA is not interpreted as I suggest, it is not doing the job envi-
sioned by Congress when it first enacted the ADA in 1990 and when it amend-
ed the Act to assure broad coverage for individuals with disabilities in 2008. If 
courts refuse to heed this argument, Congress should once again take action to 
amend the ADA to clearly protect persons with disabilities from police mis-
conduct. Even if the courts refuse to rethink their interpretation of Title II and 
Congress chooses not to act, individual states have laws that protect persons 
with disabilities that could be interpreted in a broader fashion than the federal 
law. And, state legislatures can assure such broad interpretations by amending 
their laws to clearly protect individuals with disabilities in contact with police. 
Police departments can institute new policies and procedures to protect the 
most vulnerable among us. 
But even if all of the interpretations of the laws and amendments to the 
laws suggested are followed, more is necessary to assure safety of persons of 
color with disabilities. We need structural changes to police organizations, in-
cluding the ways that police departments are organized and how police are 
trained. We need increased monetary support for social service agencies that 
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take the lead in assuring that all members of society—including the most vul-
nerable persons—will be treated fairly and with respect. In essence, legal, or-
ganizational, and societal change must occur before this problem is solved. 
While I leave for another day a discussion of the organizational and social 
changes that should take place, it is important that not only legal, but also social 
reform occur. In the meantime, both the courts and state and federal legislatures 
should take the mantle of interpreting existing law and drafting new legal pro-
visions that will assure broad protections of persons with disabilities. These 
protections will aid not only those who are of color but also those who are 
white, and they will go a long way to creating models in training and regula-
tions for how police should act with the most vulnerable civilians. 
